In fact, the extent to which transactions in the Eurodollar market can affect M~,and thereby make more difficult the Federal Reserve's task of monetary control, is at immost very somalI. Further, any effect on NI from Eurodollar transactions can he fulI~'offset by Federal Reserve'aetious. Therefore, if Eurodollar transactions do affect N-I , it must he with the concurrence of the Federal Reserve System.
I
Eurodollar deposits are dollar-denominated deposit liabilities of banks, incbmdmng branches of U.S. banks, located outside the U.S.:' These dollar-denomuinated 'See, for examnpie. "Economic Diary: Solving the Riddle of Mommetany Growth," Business Week, Novemnhcr 7, 1977 , p. 14 am md ''A Reader Writes : F tmroinai'kct I-las C ;~sñeml Comdnol of U.S. Money Supply," lime Money Manager, October 17, 1977, p. 8 . Mi is defined as demmmammd deposits phis currency and ineludes holdings of these by foreign governments, finammeial immstitutinus, and immcimviduals. as well as those of U.S. residleni mc m Fltmi'orlollar deposits are therefmmre not U.S. dollars owned exclusively by foroigmmers. It should also be noted that Euroclaims are owned not only by foreign citizens and corporations hut also by U.S. citizens and corporations, international organizations, and by national governments.
Funds can be transferred from a U.S. bank to a Eurodollar account for a variety of reasons. It may be that a U.S. citizen sees that a higher rate of interest can lie earned at a Emmrobank ( any bank outside the U.S. whiclm has dollar-denomninated assets and liabilities), or tbat a foreign corporation receives a check from a U.S. corporation in payment for goods, audi decide-s to keep those hmcls in dollars, although at a bank outside the 1,1.5.
In any event, the Eurobank now owns a demand deposit at a U.S. bank. The effect on the U.S. banking system of establishing the Eurodollar deposit has been to transfer ownership of a demand deposit from a U.S. resident to a Eurobank. Thus, the "creation" of the Eurodollar deposit has no effect on the money stock of the U.S.
The Eurobank receiving the deposit can subsequently extend dollar loans based on the demand deposit which it holds at a U.S. bank, maintaining some portion of the demand deposit at the U.S. hank as "precautionary reserves." 3 dollars are dollar-denominated claims 0mm banks outside the U.S., not bnmnnlles of U-S. cnmrrency. (Just as the bulk of tho U.S. money stock comprises claims on banks in the U.S., and mot actual ennrc, icr in cire ilatiom i. :mThere is no reasmm in primiciple why the loamm should be a dollar loam!; it could be in somne other currency. We have dealt only with a dollar loan so as to focus on the particular point at issue.
The loan might take the form of a dollar loan to a European corporation, executed by transferring some portion of the deposit which the Eurobank holds in the U.S. to a demand deposit account held by the borrowing corporation at the same or another U.S. hank. The net effect on the U.S. banking system of this Eurodollar loan again would be a transfer of ownership of demand deposit accommnts without changing the level of total U.S. demand deposits.
The foreign-based corporation receiving the Eurodollar loan in this example could use the demand deposit account which it now owns in the U.S. to make final paymnent for goods and services purchased in the U.S. Alternatively, it could1 decide to deposit part or all of the Eurodollar loan in another Eurohank. In this case, the Eurohank could extend further Eurodollar loans, pending the use of the funds by the corporation.
The "creation" of Eurodollar deposits is thus a process identical to the "creation" of bank deposits in the U.S. banking system. Eurobanks are, insofar as they deal in dollars, part of the U.S. banking system, just as Missouri banks are, in that all require U.S. dollar deposits before they can grant U.S. dollar loans. 4
In the case of the Eurodollar market, the expansion of Eurodollar deposits is based, in effect, on the transfer of ownership of demand deposits held by Eurobanks at U.S. banks.
5 The total level of demand deposit liabilities held by the U.S. banking system, however, is not changed by the multiple expansion of Eurodollar deposits.' The process is identical to that which would follow if a deposit is withdrawn from one bank in the U.S. and transferred to another. The first bank would lose reserves and have to reduce its earning assets, for example its loans, while the second hank would acquire reserves and thus he able to expand loans. In the absence of a change in the monetary base on which the loans are pyramided, the total of loans which could be extended will not change.
In summamy, the reason why movements between
and Eurodollars do not affect M 1 is that one acquires a Eurodollar asset by supplying U.S. dollars. This transfers the ownership of some U.S. dollars, but does not affect the total.
One qualification is in order. A U.S. hank may have the ability to affect demand deposits, and hence M 1 , by changing the composition of its liabilities between demand deposits and funds borrowed from the Eurodollar market. An example of this would be when a large bank in the U.S., which was holding a demand tIe-posit due to a hank in Lomidon, has that deposit converted to a loan from that hank. The immediate effect of this is a fall in M 1 , but it does release reserves, since the reserve requirement on Eurodollar borrowings is 4 percent, while that on demand deposits is 16,25 percent at the largest banks. If the entire amount of reserves which have been freed is used to make loans \vhich suhsequently he-come demand deposits at banks with a smaller marginal reserve requiremnent, and these banks then extend loans which remain as demarmd deposits at banks with the samue reserve requiretuent as themselves, an expansion of M 5 is possihle.~Ilowever, as Eurodollar transactions tend to lie eommcentrated in the larger banks, such an effect is not likely. But even should such an effect occur, as is shown below it can he fullq offset by Federal Reserve action.
So far we have examnined the effect of an owner of a part of M 1 moving his deposit to a Eurobank. It is also necessary to consider a movement from an interest earning asset, such as a time deposit, to a Eurodollar deposit. In this case, the dollars held as time deposits would initially be shifted into demand deposits, and subsequently transferred to a Eurodollar deposit. The initial shift from a time to a demand deposit would increase M,, just as would a shift from a time deposit to a demand deposit made for anỹ Currently, reserve reqmmirements on net demand deposits which apply to member banks are: 7% for banks having less than $2 million in demand deposits, 9.5% for $2-Sb million in demand deposits, 11.75% for $ 10-100 million in demand deposits, 12.75% for $100-400 million in demand deposits, and 16,25% for banks having demand tIe-posit liabilities in excess of $400 million. It can be seen that for the effect on Mm of a deposit moving from one bank to another to be nontrivial, the deposit would have to mnove from a bank with deposits in excess of $400 million to one with deposits of less than $10 million. It is useful to set out the sequence of events through which Eurodollar transactions are vie-we-cl as afl'ecting N--I,. Ommee that has been clone, it can he see-it how the Federal Re-serve, shommlcl it choose to do so, can counteract these eff 'cts. Thc-' sequence of events thrommgh which Emmroclollar market transactions aresuppose-cl to resmmlt imi inc 'eases in the U.S. money supply can be set otmt as follows. The continue-cl decline in the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar has, the argument i'immis, encommragecl Eurodollar holders to convert their Eurodollars into Deutsche marks, Swiss francs, French francs, etc. Thus, as the value of the dollar in terms of mnost Emmropean currencies declines, foreigners holding rlollar-denominated deposits in European banks ". . . have-he-en selling dollars to buy German marks and the like European central banks, it is further asserted, take part in these transaction.s by selling their domestic currencies for U.S. dollars. Sonic portion of the increased dollar balances held by European central hanks is then used to purchase U.S. Treasury securities from U.S. residents. These U.S. residents subsequently deposit the proceeds from these sales in their checking accounts. As a resmilt U.S. demand deposits, and consequently M 1 , have he-en increased. Now, as was shown above, that analysis is incomplete. It neglects that the Eurodollars had as their base deposits within the U.S. banking system. When holders of Eurodollar deposits instruct the banks at which these deposits are held to convert the deposit from dollars to some other currency, the effect may indeed he to transfer the ownership of a U.S. demand deposit from the Eurobank to a foreign central bank. If it so desires the foreign central hank may then use this U.S. demnand deposit to purchase U.S. Government securities. This transaction \voulcl transfer ownership of the U.S. demnand deposit fromu the foreign ce-mitral hank to the U.S. residents from which the securities were purchased.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST
Thus, Eurodollar deposit holders can convert these deposits into foreign currencies, ultimately resulting in foreign central bank purchases of U.S. Government M 1 , the process in the end re-suit is exactly like that tif one U.S. resident huying U.S. Government secmmrities from another; no matter how many intermediate steps the-re are, there-is ultimately no effect on Mm, except in the-case where-reserves are-released by the transactions, and that effect is. as shown above, minor.
Eve-n should that minor effect occur, the Federal Reserve can offset it in two ways.°F irst, when the Eurodollar holders se-il their dollars, they do not go along and offer the-in to foreign central banks; rather, they se-il them on the foreign exchange market to whomever will buy them. There-is nothing to stop the Federal Re-serve-System from using its foreign exchange reserves to buy the dollars at that point, thus bringing the process to a quick end, for there would be no increase in foreign central banks' holdings of dollars. Alternatively, the "reappearance" of Eurodollar deposits as U.S. demand deposits could be offset domestically. Changes in the U.S. money supply can be offset by Federal Reserve open market operations. lmm this present case, the-Federal Reserve-System svoulcl sell some-of its holdings of Government securities. This' action would re-clime-c both hank reserves amid N--I Thus, any increase in the U.S. money supply which might conceivably result from investors converting Eurodollar deposits into foreign currency holdings can readily be offset by the U.S. monetary authorities. They can offset the increase in M 1 by operating either in the foreign exchange market or in the-market for U.S. Government deht, or both. Far from being Lmnable-to offset this monetary impulse-, the-Federal Re-serve-actually has two instrmmme-nts by which it cami do so.
It is some-times claimed that the dollar's recent weakness has be-en due to self-fulfilling expectations "It is mmseful to note that even if the Federal Reserve-does not try to offset these effects omi Mi, they may he only transitory. Suppose the Federal Reserve is controlling an interest rate, such as the Federal funds rate. Smmppose further that there is an increased desire to borrow diollars ann se-Il them for some other currency. This increased denmand for credit raise-s interest rates. In attenipting to offset this rise the Federal Reserve increases bank reserves by buying Treasmmry hills. The money supply thereby expumids. Smmppose that those who sell foreign currency to dollar holders wish to buy U.S. Treasury bills.
operating in the Eurodollar market. The argument for this position is that the dollar has bee-n weak only because-NI, has lice-mi growing unduly rapidllv, and that N-I 1 has he-en growing lie-cause of Emmrodollar transactions undertake-n in the-expectation of further weakness of the dollar.
Eve-n if the argument that Eurodollar transactions could substantially affect N-4 1 \vere-correct, it is easy to see that the Federal Re-serve-can offset such influences on the U.S. money stock. Eurodollar transactions cannot be blamed for the slide in the U.S. dollar's foreign exchange value.
This increased demnannI for Treasury bills lowers interest rates. The Federal Reserve now sees interest rates falling, anti reacts by supplying Treasury bills, thus offsetting its original action.
The-net effect of transactions in the Euromarke-t on the-U.S. mnoney supply is virtually negligible. Transactions in the Eurodollar market cannot have contributed significantly -to the-re-cent growth in M 1 . Ftmrther, the argmmme-nts in the-second section of this paper show that the U.S. monetary authorities have-the ahility to offset whatever effects on N-I, Eurodollar transactions may have. The-existence of that market has not re-dmmce-d the-ability of the Federal ReserveSystem to comitrol the U.S. money stock, It there-forealso foliows that any elaimu that the foreign exchangevahme of the U.S. dollar is dee-lining because of selffulfilling expectations operating through the Eurodollar market is totally false.
/~I /
